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PHOTO:  The Taliban flag displays the 
Shahadah, the Islamic creed, which is 
the Muslim declaration of belief in the 
oneness of God and acceptance of 
Muhammad as his final prophet.
If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result 
of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every vic-
tory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor 
yourself, you will succumb in every battle.
—Sun Tzu1
One of the most widely recognized images of the present day is that of airplanes hitting the world trade center on 
11 september 2001. the terrorist organization al-Qaeda and its host, the 
taliban in afghanistan, became household names all over the world on that 
fateful day. the media started churning out stories about the brutalities of 
the taliban, and the world discovered a new monster. 
the taliban did not grow out of the dark overnight, nor was it unknown in 
the middle east, the region of the world most severely affected after 9/11. fol-
lowing its emergence in 1994 from madrassas, the taliban achieved surpris-
ing victories over its enemies and assumed rule over much of afghanistan.2 
simultaneously hailed as saviors and feared as oppressors, the taliban were 
an almost mythical phenomenon that seemed to embody the very essence 
of afghan cultural beliefs, especially revenge for transgression, hospitality 
for enemies, and readiness to die for honor. the taliban knew the afghan 
people and their ways and embedded themselves in the complex afghan 
web of tribalism, religion, and ethnicity. 
despite their quick overthrow in 2002 by a small coalition of U.s. forces 
and anti-taliban groups, the taliban has not gone away. in fact, today, in 
the face of thousands of nato and U.s. troops, a growing afghan national 
army (ana), and a popularly elected government, the movement’s influ-
ence in afghanistan is increasing. it continues to wage an insurgency that 
has prevented the new government from establishing legitimacy, and it has 
created massive unrest in Pakistan. clearly, it behooves us to know something 
more about this archaic but formidable enemy.
History
today’s taliban has been shaped by a host of influences and events: 
afghanistan’s ancient warrior culture. ●
the 1979 soviet invasion and the mujahideen who fought against it. ●
the civil war and warlordism that followed the withdrawal of soviet  ●
forces in 1989.
The views reflected in this 
article are the authors’ 
own. They do not reflect the 
official opinions or policy 
of either the U.S. Army or 
the Pakistan Army.
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madrassa religious ideology. ●
the taliban’s initial acceptance as the hope of  ●
peace for a war-weary people.
the movement’s downfall in 2002. ●
the ongoing insurgency. ● 3
the taliban is comprised mostly of sunni muslim 
Pashtuns. historically, this largest afghan ethnic 
group occupied a great swath of land from central 
western afghanistan through much of the south and 
up the country’s eastern border. the region has a 
long history of invaders who tried, mostly in vain, 
to overpower the Pashtuns. since alexander in 326 
B.c., many foreign military forces have entered 
afghanistan, among them Persians, scythians, 
Kushans, sakas, huns, arabs, turks, mongols, 
British, russians, and most recently, americans 
and their nato allies.4 
fiercely independent, the Pashtuns have always 
defended their homeland against foreign interlopers. 
no outside power has ever been able to subdue them 
completely.5 they defeated most of their would-be 
conquerors outright or absorbed them into their tribes 
through the centuries. the Pashtuns adapted to the 
military strategies of their invaders, and then utilized 
their new tactics and equipment to fight among them-
selves until confronted by another external threat. 
this military orientation has shaped the Pashtun—
and taliban—outlook: “A Pashtun is never at peace, 
except when he is at war.”6 the Pashtuns are inclined 
not to accept any form of strict authority, even at the 
cost of discord and insecurity.7 
the “great game” in the 19th century helped 
shape the current political landscape of the Pashtun 
region.8 it also gave the Pashtuns their first 
encounters with a modern military power, during 
the three anglo-afghan wars (1839, 1878, and 
1919). after unsuccessful attempts to gain headway 
inside afghanistan, russia and Britain agreed to 
create a buffer between their zones of influence. 
Because of provisions for easement rights, the 
1893 international boundary between British india 
and afghanistan, the durand line, did not affect 
afghans  with strong ethnic and family connections 
to Pashtuns living across the border. the British 
gave semiautonomous status to the tribes on the 
British-india side of the border by creating the 
tribal agencies, which morphed into the Pakistani 
federally administered tribal areas (fata) after 
their independence.9
Pashtun areas generally remained quiet until the 
last quarter of the 20th century, when the relative 
stability that afghanistan knew under zahir shah’s 
four-decade rule ended (1973). the unsteadiness that 
ensued was the catalyst for the communist People’s 
democratic Party of afghanistan to overthrow the 
government in 1978. afghanistan’s conservative 
religious elements, led by mujahideen, resisted the 
new regime’s radical reform package, which brought 
about new taxes, drastic changes in land ownership, 
compulsory education for women, and female par-
ticipation in nontraditional roles in society.10 
the soviet Union deployed troops into afghani-
stan in december 1979 to aid its communist ally 
against islamist militias and to counter the threat of 
radical islamists gaining power in muslim central 
asian republics along the soviet Union’s soft under-
belly.11 this action fueled the mujahideen resistance 
and calls for jihad. in response, the soviet military 
waged a brutal counterinsurgency campaign. in 
nearly 10 years of occupation, soviet forces and 
their afghan communist allies reportedly killed 
1.3 million afghans, destroyed the infrastructure 
in urban and rural areas of the country, and caused 
5.5 million afghans to flee to refugee camps in iran 
and Pakistan. (most of them found their way to the 
tribal belt of Pakistan.)12 
despite heavy investments in men and materiel, 
the soviets were never able to gain unopposed 
access to the countryside, especially in the Pashtun 
region, where urban areas and government centers, 
virtually under siege by the mujahideen, were only 
occasionally penetrated by the soviets (and then 
only in massive operations).13 in february 1989, 
the soviets withdrew from afghanistan. six months 
before they left, the soviets handed over huge 
caches of weapons and ammunition to government 
forces. they continued to provide materiel support 
for two years after their departure, but their with-
drawal essentially left the government to fend for 
itself. a civil war followed, resulting in the com-
munist government stepping down in april 1992. 
differences among the mujahideen parties quickly 
revealed themselves. each faction had a leader or 
warlord with aspirations for power. fighting broke 
out, leading to widespread looting and rapine. strife 
between the warlords and a war-weary population 
led to an environment that allowed the taliban’s 
radical ideas to take hold.14
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the core of the taliban 
grew from the Pashtun refugee 
camps, mostly in Pakistan, 
where a modified and selec-
tively interpreted version of 
wahhabist islam influenced 
some madrassa students (talib) 
to adopt an ultraconservative 
approach to social issues and 
politics.15 theological students 
fighting for professed rights 
and freedoms are not a new 
phenomenon in the region, 
and these talibs, now formally 
calling themselves the taliban, 
presented themselves as righ-
teous religious students on the 
march for peace.16 the tali-
ban’s claims resonated with 
the Pashtun people, and their 
popularity spread rapidly. 
in november 1994, the taliban seized control of 
Kandahar in southern afghanistan. they gained de 
facto religious legitimacy among the rural Pashtuns 
when their leader, mullah muhammad omar, wore 
the sacred cloak of Prophet muhammad in front of 
a public gathering and declared himself “leader 
of the faithful” (Amir-ul-Momineen).17 this event, 
arguably the most important milestone in the tali-
ban’s history, allowed omar to claim his right to 
“lead not just all afghans, but all muslims.”18 it 
provided the movement with a charismatic leader 
who was thereafter able to draw upon the mysticism 
inherent in Pashtun culture.19
the taliban made rapid military progress and by 
1997 controlled 95 percent of the country.20 despite 
initial euphoria, the group gradually lost the support 
of the international community and the afghan popu-
lace because it strictly enforced its extremist version 
of islamic law. the taliban banned television, music, 
and dancing; prohibited women from attending school 
and working outside the home; carried out atrocities 
against afghanistan’s non-sunni population; and 
allegedly supported militant sunni sectarian groups 
in Pakistan. mullah omar also interacted with osama 
bin-laden, and the taliban hosted al-Qaeda training 
camps and leaders in areas under their control.
omar’s refusal to extradite Bin-laden after 9/11 
triggered operation enduring freedom (oef), which 
led to the rapid collapse of the taliban and al-Qaeda 
in afghanistan. many taliban fighters assimilated 
into afghan society, while the leaders went under-
ground to emerge later as the core of an insurgency. 
the war-ravaged population’s unmet expectations 
and non-Pashtun dominance of the central govern-
ment at Kabul gave the insurgency impetus.
in Pakistan’s fata and north west frontier Prov-
ince (nwfP), Pashtuns sympathetic to the taliban 
have been at odds with Pakistan security forces. 
during the russian occupation of afghanistan, Paki-
stan and the U.s. used the fata as launching pads 
for sponsored mujahideen, making the tribal areas a 
hotbed for extremism. the sprouting of madrassas, 
an abundance of modern weaponry, and an influx 
of afghan refugees radicalized the environment. 
after the soviets departed, many foreign mujahideen 
(mostly arabs) settled in the fata and were absorbed 
into tribes through marriage. due to ethnic, religious, 
ideological, and cultural affinities, the area’s residents 
viewed the taliban’s rise favorably. after 9/11 and 
oef, radical elements in the fata mobilized some 
support for the taliban and started targeting the 
Pakistani government because of its support to oef. 
Pakistan has since deployed over 100,000 troops 
to different parts of the fata to counter militants 
with similar operational signatures loosely aligned 
with the taliban in afghanistan. recently, taliban 
An Afghan man passes by a line of abandoned Soviet military vehicles near Asadabad, 
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sympathizers in Pakistan joined forces to form an 
umbrella organization called tehrik-i-taliban Paki-
stan (Pakistani taliban movement). they appointed 
Baitullah mehsud as their leader.21
Culture
culture is probably the most important factor 
in the counterinsurgency fight in afghanistan. 
“wars,” michael howard has opined, “are not tac-
tical exercises writ large . . . they are . . . conflicts 
of societies, and they can be fully understood only 
if one understands the nature of the society fight-
ing them.”22 the taliban presence is most evident 
in Pashtun areas. according to thomas Johnson, 
director of the naval Postgraduate school’s Pro-
gram for culture and conflict studies, “while it 
would be incorrect to refer to the taliban insurrec-
tion or resurrection as merely a Pashtun affair, it 
would not be far from the mark.”23 
Pashtun culture depends greatly on the Pashtun-
wali code of honor, which predates islam and is 
specific to the Pashtuns.24 a Pashtun “must adhere 
[to] the code to maintain his honor [and] to retain 
his identity as a Pashtun.”25 those violating the code 
are subject to the verdict of a jirga.26 some of the 
more important facets of the code include—
Nang  ● (honor). a tribesman is obliged to 
employ every means possible to shield and protect 
his honor and the honor of his family. the honor of 
a Pashtun rests on a host of small rules and customs, 
which, if infringed, demand a restoration of honor 
even at the cost of one’s life. 
Badal  ● (revenge). when someone kills a family 
member or violates the honor of a woman in the 
family, revenge is necessary to restore honor. it 
often leads to a killing. this revenge can occur 
immediately or generations later if the family whose 
honor has been violated is in a weak position when 
the infraction occurs. the taliban has used badal to 
recruit new fighters after civilian deaths caused by 
coalition bombings and “hard-knock operations.”27 
Melmastia  ● (hospitality). hospitality and 
protection must be offered to all visitors without 
expectation of remuneration or favor. any Pashtun 
who can gain access to the house of another Pashtun 
can claim asylum there, regardless of the previous 
relationship between the two parties.28 the taliban 
use melmastia to obtain food and shelter when they 
travel within the Pashtun belt.
Nanawatay ●  (to seek forgiveness). to preempt 
badal, the code allows Pashtuns to seek forgiveness 
from those whom one has wronged. the offend-
ing party goes to the house of their enemy to beg 
forgiveness and make peace with him. nanawatay 
is the only alternative to badal. the taliban does 
not emphasize nanawatay; it exhorts aggrieved 
persons to join the insurgency to restore their honor 
or avenge the death of family members.
Hamsaya ●  (“one who shares the same shadow”). 
hamsaya is servitude in return for protection from 
stronger tribes or provision of some goods. for 
example, it could entail an exchange of military 
service for land. this practice explains why tribes 
quickly follow whomever is strongest. it also 
explains how the taliban consolidated power so 
quickly in the 1990s.29 
although rivals, Pashtun tribes rally against 
outsiders if threatened. they are politically well 
informed and will use alliances and counter-
alliances to their advantage—as in the present 
war. as the Christian Science Monitor has noted, 
“the rules of this war are a far cry from the easy 
slogans of ‘you’re either with us or against us.’ 
indeed, Pashtun history is filled with heroes who 
played both sides for the benefit of tribe, family, 
and honor.”30 
Religion
the taliban rely chiefly upon religion to sway the 
afghan people, 99 percent of whom are muslim (80 
percent sunni, 19 percent shi’a).31 in the afghan 
islamic tradition, the core religion is combined 
with pre-islamic beliefs and the tribal customs of 
Pashtunwali.32 the taliban have further transformed 
the tradition with an ultraconservative interpretation 
of islam.  
the distinctiveness of their religious ideology 
arose from the madrassas founded during the 
soviet-afghan war. with saudi arabian sup-
port, many schools shifted to an orthodox brand 
of islam, one that follows a salafist egalitarian 
model and stringently enforces compliance.33 in 
ahmed rashid’s words, “the taliban represented 
nobody but themselves and they recognized no 
islam except their own.”34 the majority of afghans 
did not want to follow this new version of islam, 
but harsh enforcement by the taliban gave them 
little choice. 
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Ethnicity 
afghanistan is 42 percent Pashtun, 27 percent 
tajik, 9 percent hazara, 9 percent Uzbek, 4 percent 
aimak, 3 percent turkmen, 2 percent Balochi, and 
4 percent other.35
there are even more Pashtuns in Pakistan 
than in afghanistan, and most live in the border 
areas—the fata and nwfP. although obscure 
genealogies, myths and folklore, historical alli-
ances, and conflicts make it extremely difficult 
to draw dividing lines, there are five major tribal 
groups: the durrani, ghilzai, Karlanri, sarbani, 
and ghurghusht. the durrani and the ghilzai are 
the two most influential.36
Durranis. the durrani tribal confederation, 
mostly concentrated in southeast afghanistan, has 
traditionally provided leadership in the Pashtun 
areas since ahmad shah durrani founded a mon-
archy in 1747. afghans regard ahmad shah as 
the founder of modern afghanistan because he 
united the factional tribes. the current president of 
afghanistan, hamid Karzai, is a durrani. 
Ghilzais. the ghilzai tribal group is concentrated 
mostly in eastern afghanistan and has historically 
been an archrival of the durranis. some of the 
major taliban leaders today, including mullah 
omar, are ghilzais.37 the ghilzais are part of a 
relatively obscure tribal confederation known as 
the Bitanis.38
Karlanris. the Karlanris, or “hill tribes,” are 
the third largest group of Pashtuns.39 they straddle 
the border areas between Pakistan and afghanistan 
in waziristan, Kurram, Peshawar, Khost, Paktia, 
and Paktika.40
Sarbanis. although geo-
graphically separated, two major 
groups make up the sarbani. the 
larger group, located north of 
Peshawar, includes tribes such 
as the mohmands, yusufzais, 
and shinwaris, while the smaller 
segment consists of sheranis 
and tarins scattered in northern 
Balochistan.41 this faction com-
prises the traditional aristocracy 
of the Pashtun.
Ghurghushts. the last major 
tribal group is the ghurghusht. 
they are found mostly in north-
ern Balochistan and include 
tribes such as the Kakars, man-
dokhels, Panars, and musa Khel. 
some of the groups’ sub-tribes, 
like the gaduns and safis, can 








NOte:  adapted from Johnson and Mason, Understanding the Taliban and Insurgency in Afghanistan.  
Figure 2. Location of major Pashtun tribal groups.
















Figure 1. Tribal areas, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
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Resources
the taliban can access a full range of resources, 
from labor to technology. the primary resources 
examined here include religious allies, human ter-
rain, and the opium trade.43 
Religious allies. amid a myriad of transconti-
nental terrorists, al-Qaeda particularly gives the 
taliban a religious cause and some legitimacy, 
assists the taliban information-warfare effort, and 
provides the movement money, personnel (for-
eign fighters), technology (advanced improvised 
explosive devices—ieds—and communications), 
and tactical training support. tehreek-i-nifaz-i-
shariat-i-muhammadi, a group in the fata and the 
nwfP’s swat regions, is another strong taliban 
sympathizer. also supporting or at least coordinat-
ing with the taliban are the central asian islamic 
movement of Uzbekistan (imU), hizb-i-islami 
gulbuddin (hig), the eastern turkestan islamic 
movement (etim), and a number of other, smaller, 
militant bands. 
some of the madrassas in the Pashtun belt teach a 
violent version of islamic ideology that mixes ethnic 
and religious sentiments. these schools are good 
recruiting grounds for the taliban. mohammed ali 
siddiqi, a madrassa expert, explains the phenom-
enon as “an accident of history”: “the leadership 
of the islamic movement has fallen to the Pash-
tuns as they had resisted the soviet occupation of 
afghanistan successfully. then the Pashtun taliban 
triumphed [in afghanistan]. . . .since the madrassas 
had played a prominent role in the anti-soviet jihad, 
they acquired a reputation both as recruiting grounds 
for mujahideen and as centers of learning.”44
Human terrain. this asset is crucial to the suc-
cess or failure of the taliban insurgency. simply 
put, an uprising cannot maintain itself without 
the support of the people. the Pashtuns, rendered 
vulnerable by what they perceive to be a lack of 
influence in the Kabul government,  have been 
more amenable to the taliban lately. moreover, 
“Pashtun suspicions and mistrust of the govern-
ment were further heightened by the afghan tran-
sitional authority’s inability to protect Pashtuns 
from the wave of human rights abuses perpetrated 
by insurgents and warlords since the fall of the 
taliban.”45 thus, the approximately 28 million 
Pashtuns in afghanistan and Pakistan contribute 
recruits, support personnel, money, weapons, and 
an intelligence network to the taliban insurgency.46 
they also provide superb real-time intelligence on 
most troop movements, allowing taliban fighters 
to flee when outnumbered or to set-up ambushes 














































































































Figure 3. Pashtun tribal groups and sub-tribes.
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two generations of war-hardened inhabitants to 
draw from, the taliban recruit experienced fighters 
who know the terrain and can survive in the harsh 
environment. an added bonus is the ordnance the 
mujahideen cached throughout the country during 
the afghan-soviet war, the subsequent civil war, 
and the taliban’s consolidation of power. 
Drug revenue. the taliban’s last key resource is 
the illegal drug trade, which provides revenue and 
other benefits. with improved irrigation and more 
rain, afghanistan has virtually become a narco-state.47 
the record 2006 opium harvest was worth over $3 
billion.48 the 2007 estimates are even higher. afghani-
stan currently produces 93 percent of the world’s 
opium—almost one-half of afghanistan’s gross 
domestic product comes from this trade.49 the exact 
amount the taliban receives from it is unclear, but they 
tax farmers, landowners, and drug traffickers. while 
the group initially vowed to eliminate opium, they 
look to it now as a necessary evil to further their cause: 
not only does it generate funds for the insurgency, 
but it poisons the decadent west, especially europe, 
which gets 90 percent of its heroin from afghanistan. 
the drug traffickers and the taliban help each other 
with weapons, personnel, and money, all to destabilize 
the islamic republic of afghanistan (iroa). 
Physical Terrain
the physical terrain on which the taliban, their 
sympathizers, and coalition forces operate is harsh. 
afghanistan and the fata comprise over 250,000 
square miles, more than 70 percent of which is a 
mountainous mix of arid plateaus, thickly forested 
mountains, and craggy valleys. 50 only 12 percent 
of the land is arable.
southern and western afghanistan are mostly 
desert except for the helmand river area.51 lines 
of communication infrastructure are either under-
developed or virtually nonexistent. roads align 
with watersheds and valleys and pass through 
deep gorges that for centuries have been the sites 
of murderous ambushes by local warriors. Built on 
defendable vantage points, houses are generally 
well fortified. it is extremely difficult to control 
access routes to towns, villages, and the popula-
tion in such a difficult landscape. multiple pockets 
of inaccessible space governed through tribal law 
allow militants freedom of maneuver while making 
conventional military operations ineffective and 
expensive in terms of troops and resources. in short, 
the terrain is conducive to insurgent activities.52 
like the region’s culture, the rugged geography 
remains virtually unaffected by time. afghanistan is 
“a place where the land fashions the people, rather 
than the people fashioning the land.”53
Strategy
according to thomas h. Johnson, “what the 
taliban wants is a return to its pre-9/11 status. . . . 
the taliban are driven by two competing interests: 
the desire to re-conquer afghanistan and the desire 
to reestablish a caliphate. the first is Pashtun-
centric, the second more al-Qaeda-inspired.”54 
the taliban’s insurgency strategy is one of patience. 
they are conducting a classic “war of the flea,” aimed 
at causing their enemy to suffer the “dog’s disadvan-
tages: too much to defend; too small, ubiquitous, 
and agile an enemy to come to grips with. if the war 
continues long enough[,]…the dog succumbs to 
exhaustion. . .”55 an often quoted taliban axiom is 
“the americans may have the watches, but we have 
the time.”56 their plan has four aims, or phases:
mobilize the religious public in afghanistan  ●
and Pakistan. 
rally the Pashtun tribes through the Pashtun- ●
wali code and religious ideology and by emphasiz-
ing the Pashtuns’ subjugation by a predominantly 
non-Pashtun government in Kabul. 
Build up confidence in their organization  ●
while simultaneously attacking the legitimacy of 
the iroa, coalition forces, and the government 
of Pakistan.57 
once the western “crusaders” are expelled by  ●
military means or withdraw due to lack of politi-
cal will, control eastern and southern afghanistan 
and then push for influence in western Pakistan—
establishing their version of an islamic state.58
Structure 
the taliban have different organizational struc-
tures at different tiers in their hierarchy. Before 9/11, 
the group operated in a conventional, centralized 
manner at its top and middle levels. however, during 
insurgent activities, the organization becomes flatter 
and gives local commanders more independence, 
so that they can adapt to the demands of a complex 
environment and benefit from dispersing their 
forces into small units.59 (see figure 4.) 
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specialized departments at the taliban’s top and 
middle tiers include suicide squads, media outlets 
like Ummat studios and radio shariat, and spe-
cialized training outfits imparting the technical 
skills to develop ieds. other departments provide 
a centralized pool of special skills.
the taliban organization is a network of fran-
chises, an arrangement that fits well with tribal 
traditions. a small militant group begins calling 
itself “the local taliban.” it gains some form of 
recognition from the central taliban hierarchy in 
return for its support and cooperation. the new cell 
supports taliban grand strategy, but retains local 
freedom of action. this modus operandi preserves 
tribal loyalties and territorial boundaries. 
a typical taliban village cell has between 10 and 
50 part-time fighters and a smattering of ideologi-
cally motivated persons and mercenaries from other 
areas. the cell runs its own intelligence collection, 
logistics, and population-control activities with 
coordination and support from other cells. cell con-
figurations vary with the environment. essentially 
performing most tasks independently, the cell has 
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Figure 5. Forms of interdependence in the Taliban.
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for physical and intelligence support; sequential 
interdependence for passage of information and 
couriers, equipment, and sometimes finances; and 
pooled interdependence with the higher hierar-
chy for media operations, ied-making, technical 
intelligence collection, specialized training, and 
additional financial support.
Leadership. the taliban acknowledge mullah 
omar as their leader. the charismatic omar is 
assisted by the supreme taliban shura, the taliban’s 
version of a board of governors.60 mullah dadullah, 
for example, had military responsibilities in addition 
to being a member of the shura. the original (2003) 
members of the shura reportedly included Jalalud-
din haqqani, saifur rahman mansoor, mullah 
dadullah (replaced by mullah Bakht),61 akhtar 
mohammad osmani, akhtar mohammad mansoor, 
mullah obaidullah, hafiz abdul majeed, mullah 
mohammad rasul, mullah Barodar, and mullah 
abdur razzaq akhundzada.62 most of them are also 
regional military commanders or military advisors. 
at regional and local levels, leadership roles can 
become ambiguous when different leaders struggle 
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NOte: this depiction of regional areas is for illustration only and does not represent the actual territorial boundaries of the supposed taliban commanders.  
Figure 6. Supposed regional Taliban leadership.
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a process that designates a regional leader and 
provides him with an elaborate command structure 
to coordinate and control operations.63 designated 
regional commanders control sub-commands along 
territorial or tribal boundaries, as well as functional 
divisions. (see figure 6.) 
Decision-making. the taliban’s top leaders 
behave in an authoritarian manner, outlining policy 
decisions, although mullah omar, once known for 
micromanagement, has been forced by the opera-
tional environment to adopt a less intrusive style 
of leadership. the taliban’s middle and lower tier 
leaders are more informal. they generally rely 
on consensus in a jirga to maintain their support. 
clergy and tribal elders usually vet decisions to 
elicit the support of the populace. 
Coordination and communication. on the ground, 
the taliban insurgency is a decentralized, loosely run 
affair. the supreme shura carries out strategic plan-
ning, issues directives to regional commanders, and 
disseminates the directives to village cells as fatwas, 
or decrees. the village cell acts in a semi-independent 
manner with minimum control from above. while they 
follow the supreme shura’s policies, cell leaders plan 
and conduct activities based on the regional situation 
and incentives or dangers for the group. 
a regional or local taliban leader’s span of 
control depends on the nature of the tasks ahead. 
for routine tasks, links and reporting relationships 
resemble a traditional hierarchical pyramid where 
information passes vertically (figure 7a). how-
ever, in a coordinated operation, network features 
come into play, and the taliban passes information 
and support horizontally, vertically, or diagonally 
(figure 7b), with remarkable speed and efficiency—
disrupting a few communication channels does not 
slow the passage. the taliban has also successfully 
used network swarming tactics, in which small units 
converge on specific targets and then disperse.64  
to relay sensitive verbal or written messages, the 
taliban use couriers.65 the courier network relies 
on tribal links and loyalties for speed and security. 
the taliban use short-range radios for tactical com-
munications and employ an extensive code system. 
some taliban cells in Pakistan use the internet 
for propaganda purposes and to communicate in 
settled areas. Nameh-i-shab (night letters), usually 
“declarations of intent” for population control, are 
another form of taliban communication.66 
Recruitment and training. the taliban do not 
have a formal recruitment process. they draw new 
recruits from among madrassa students and local 
tribal youths motivated by the appeal of glamour, 
feelings of revenge, financial incentives, and reli-
gious beliefs. the local cell is the recruiting hub. 
recruitment exploits family and clan loyalties, 
tribal lineage, personal friendships, social networks, 
madrassa alumni circles, and shared interests. 
A. Typical reporting and direction 
for policy decisions
B. Reporting and direction for  


























Figure 7. Taliban linkages, coordination, and reporting mechanisms.
68 May-June 2008  Military review 
after innocent afghans suffer collateral damage in 
coalition operations, the desire for badal prompts 
an influx of recruits. to boost recruiting efforts, 
the taliban often uses its fighters as bait to induce 
violent U.s. and nato responses.67
Because almost everyone in Pashtun tribal soci-
ety is armed, recruits usually possess basic military 
skills. they receive significant on-the-job training 
and must prove their military ability in a peer-
review system similar to those routinely employed 
in Pashtun tribes. Brave, pious, and politically 
sound recruits gain prominence within a cell. soon, 
they either become its leader or depart to form a 
new cell of their own. 
Motivation. the taliban seek congruence among 
their members’ personal motivations, the cell’s 
interests, and the organization’s objectives. seth 
Jones has described the two main motivations 
behind the taliban insurgency:
the top tier of the taliban leadership 
structure and key commanders . . . are 
motivated by their interpretation [of] radical 
islam, and see the insurgency as a fight with 
western infidels, and the west’s “puppet 
government” in Kabul. 
the bottom tier includes thousands of 
local fighters and their support network. 
the taliban pays young men from rural 
villages to set up roadside bombs, launch 
rockets and mortars at nato and afghan 
forces, or pick up a gun for a few days. most 
are not ideologically committed to jihad. 
rather, they are motivated because they are 
unemployed, disenchanted with the lack of 
change since 2001, or angry because a local 
villager was killed or wounded by afghan, 
U.s., or nato forces.”68
the taliban persuade their recruits to act in accor-
dance with the organization’s wishes by offering 
monetary rewards to people driven by money, status 
to people seeking power, and a sense of glamour 
to the adventurous who seek glory in tribal society. 
they also punish those found wanting by withhold-
ing money, reducing their status in the organization, 
subjecting them or their kin to physical violence, 
and alienating them from the tribal community. 
the taliban also have a loosely defined code of 
conduct, which they expect their fighters and com-
manders to follow. in december 2007, the taliban 
issued a code of conduct (layeha) to communicate 
the organization’s rules to its members.69 the 
central leadership can disown a member or com-
mander for any significant violation of the rules; 
for example, in January 2008 they sacked mullah 
mansoor dadullah for failing to “obey the rules of 
the islamic emirate.”70
The Taliban Securing its Future
the taliban applies its resources and structures 
toward its strategic goals. it influences the environ-
ment to perpetuate growth in three categories: 
coercive capabilities—activities in which  ●
the threat or direct application of force influences 
the environment in a way that feeds back into the 
resources of the taliban. 
internal political influence—nonviolent means  ●
of affecting the environment, such as developing 
shadow government structures. 
external political influence—efforts to iso- ●
late afghanistan and its neighbors from external 
assistance and to spread the taliban ideology to 
surrounding neighbor states, in particular Pakistan, 
in order to control a greater resource base and to 
continue to expand. 
Coercive capabilities. the taliban’s use of war-
of-the-flea guerrilla tactics has forced coalition units 
to spread themselves out over too large an area and 
to respond to taliban actions with disproportionate 
amounts of force, thus causing more damage to the 
civilian population than to the insurgents.71 
today’s guerrilla strategy reflects a change in 
taliban operations. afghans knew mullah omar 
for his robin hood-like actions as a protector of the 
people in the taliban’s early days.72 now, the taliban 
take advantage of the Pashtunwali code’s tenet of 
nanawetey to obtain shelter within the population. 
the taliban commander in helmand province 
claims, “the people are with us. they give us food, 
they give us shelter.”73 of course, the shelter may 
often be coerced rather than freely given, as a report 
from ghanzi province suggests: “People wait to 
speak with their favorite deputy . . . one is a school 
teacher, the other a member of the municipal council. 
they don’t even dare say their names out of fear of 
potential reprisals.”74 in Karabah, “taliban regime 
sympathizers rode through the streets of six Karabah 
district villages with loud speakers, threatening any 
who cooperated with the afghan government with 
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death. for three months, the taliban have become 
emboldened, and now they make these ‘visits’ with 
their faces uncovered. yet no one has denounced 
them. why would they? the last time the villagers 
pointed out who was responsible for an attack, the 
perpetrators were released immediately after paying 
the district chief of police some money.”75
civilian casualties are increasing as the taliban 
and coalition forces continue to struggle. accord-
ing to human rights watch, taliban attacks caused 
699 civilian casualties in 2006.76 the data in table 
1 below, compiled by the afghanistan ngo secu-
rity office, shows the intentional versus collateral 
damage toll on the civil populace in the first six 
months of 2007.77 
the taliban campaign has driven a wedge 
between coalition forces and the people, whom 
coalition forces see as de facto supporters of 
the taliban. conversely, the people believe that 
coalition forces are culturally insensitive, cause 
unnecessary civilian casualties, and fail to offer 
appropriate reparations for those casualties. the 
people then embrace badal, increasing passive sup-
port for the taliban and creating a pool of potential 
new fighters. 
the taliban’s coercion campaign also fuels 
popular frustration with the iroa. the ngo safety 
office reported that the first six months of 2007 
saw a 50 percent increase in contact between the 
populace and the taliban and other armed opposi-
tion groups.78 most of these instances were nonle-
thal, but 60 percent were abductions or attempts to 
intimidate. forty percent of the attacks involved 
direct-fire weapons (rocket-propelled grenades and 
small arms), assaults, ied attacks, or arson.79 
the taliban’s constant gnawing prevents work-
ers and material from reaching far-flung parts of 
afghanistan. as one european security official said, 
“[the people] are concerned that the base level of 
their lives is not improved, and that’s the challenge 
that the insurgency provides—delaying the ability 
of the government to be able to deliver, by keeping 
certain areas unstable.”80 the result of the taliban’s 
depredations is disillusionment, anger toward those 
who promised a better life, and a desire to return to 
the taliban to replace frustration with stability. 
the taliban have also stepped up the use of suicide 
bombers to fortify the movement: since 2006, the 
number of such attacks has increased remarkably.81 
Produced through the interaction between al-Qaeda 
and the taliban, the new wave of suicide troops 
demonstrates the difference between the taliban’s 
early robin hood tactics and its current disregard 
for civilians. these human weapons have produced 
more casualties among the civilian population than 
among the international security forces.82 as a 
result, the Un high com-
missioner for human 
rights  has  accused 
the taliban of deliber-
ately targeting civilians 
in order to undermine 
the iroa.83 the tactic 
seems to be working: 
afghans now minimize 
contact with coalition 
agencies because of the 
increased risk in going 
near coalition troops or 
bases. of course, the 
taliban’s propaganda 
machine attempts to 
avoid responsibility for 
civilian casualties, usu-
ally blaming them on the 
coalition, as a 2007 story 














Table 1.  Causes of NGO reported casualties.
leGeND:  AOG, Armed Opposition Groups; IMF, International military forces (NATO, U.S.) ; SAF, Small arms fire 
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“the taliban have told us that a suicide... [attack 
was] carried out this morning ... [and] they killed 
four italians and injured three others. their version 
is that any civilians who were killed died in gunfire, 
which happened afterwards—they haven’t claimed 
responsibility for the deaths of the civilians.”84 this 
tactic coerces default support for the taliban by 
alienating the population from coalition forces and 
the afghan government. 
coercive efforts to indoctrinate afghan youth 
target the country’s education system. in 2006, 
taliban militants killed 20 teachers and destroyed 
some 200 schools.85 in 2007, they forced another 
300 schools to close.86 in January 2007, the taliban 
said it had put aside one million dollars to establish 
schools in the six southern provinces of afghani-
stan. “[the] taliban are not against education,” they 
claimed; rather, “the taliban want sharia (islamic) 
education.”87 the group hopes to build a controlled, 
madrassa-style educational system after destroying 
all other educational resources. the taliban is secur-
ing a future resource, the people, for years to come. 
Internal influences. the taliban has proven to 
be a resilient organization. after being ousted from 
power, it was able to regroup and set up a parallel 
government. this “shadow government” seeks to 
expand its power by gaining control over territory 
and undermining the legitimacy of the iroa.88 
former top-ranking taliban general and current 
member of the iroa parliament mullah abdul 
salam rocketi noted its existence early on: “the 
whole general staff of the taliban resistance is . . . 
like a real shadow government.”89 
the taliban also seem to be infiltrating the legiti-
mate government. coalition forces noticed this in 
2005, when afghan amnesty programs allowed 
taliban members to rejoin 
afghan society and partici-
pate in the elections. as one 
operations officer said:
there were guys on the 
candidate list that we knew 
had loose affiliations with 
the [taliban] or were facili-
tators or were in some other 
way soiled with the stain 
of the [taliban] or were on 
our target list in some way, 
shape or form…that dem-
onstrated to us that these guys will attempt 
to build some kind of shadow government 
through the legitimate elections so that they 
can have people in place to take over those 
positions of responsibility, if and when their 
way of life and their way of government is 
reinstitutionalized by collapsing the legiti-
mate government.90 
while it may be difficult to confirm the true alle-
giances of returning taliban members until they 
choose to reveal them, the perception of wolves in 
sheep’s clothing in government serves to further 
undermine the iroa. 
meanwhile, the taliban is promoting the legiti-
macy of their shadow government, as proven by 
their drafting a new constitution of the islamic 
emirate of afghanistan in december 2006.91 the 
taliban is making a point of acting as a government 
in exile, so that their sympathizers in arab states 
can more easily justify supporting them.
Regional and international influence. the July 
2007 red mosque incident in islamabad demon-
strates the taliban’s ability to influence politics in 
the region. the militants who imposed taliban-style 
sharia law in their islamabad community sparked an 
eight-day standoff with government forces, a stale-
mate that concluded with Pakistani troops storming 
the complex. in the ensuing melee, 10 soldiers and 
over 90 militants were killed.92 this police action 
caused a wave of civil unrest and sparked calls for 
President musharraf to resign. 
more recently, the assassination of former Paki-
stani prime minister Benazir Bhutto has shown the 
level of interest the taliban takes in the future of 
Pakistan. Both the Pakistani government and the 
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tion on Baitulla mehsud, commander of the taliban 
movement of Pakistan.93 mehsud is reported to have 
pledged allegiance to mullah omar, whose ideo-
logical beliefs he shares.94 this extension of taliban 
influence to Pakistan demonstrates the organiza-
tion’s successful attempt to expand regionally.
the taliban’s international influence was also 
evident in the July 2007 abduction and apparent 
execution of two german nationals involved in a 
dam project (along with five afghans) and the kid-
napping of a busload of south Korean missionaries. 
taliban members claim they executed the germans 
after germany ignored a deadline to withdraw its 
3,000 troops from afghanistan. the Korean hostages 
faced a similar fate when the taliban demanded 
Korea withdraw its 200 troops from the region. after 
the taliban killed two of the Koreans, the south 
Korean government gave in to the taliban’s demand 
and agreed to pull its personnel out of afghanistan. 
(the remaining hostages were released.)95 
these campaigns benefit the taliban in several 
ways. in the wake of the red mosque incident and 
continued student protests, pressure on Pakistan to 
give in to demands for taliban-style religious rule 
increased, producing more public support for the 
taliban and a greater pool of potential recruits. 
with the hostage-taking and killings, the taliban 
exposed the government’s inability to protect 
foreigners and showed it could dictate terms to 
national governments.
the influence the taliban exerts can also be seen in 
the recent rift between the U.s. and its coalition part-
ners over shared burdens in afghanistan. with their 
patient tactics, the taliban are testing the national 
wills of coalition states and the strength of the alli-
ance as the mission in afghanistan lengthens. 
recently, U.s. secretary of defense robert gates 
criticized nato’s effort against the taliban in south-
ern afghanistan. gates told the Los Angeles Times 
that coalition forces in the south do not know how to 
fight a counterinsurgency and may be contributing to 
the escalation of violence.96 the netherlands, United 
Kingdom, and canada, whose troops have endured 
much of the fighting in southern afghanistan, pro-
tested gates’ remarks.97 canada’s national demo-
cratic Party leader, Jack layton, said that the remarks 
could be the tipping point that drives canada out of 
afghanistan. a nato spokesman responded, “it’s 
not helpful when there’s media speculation about 
divisions between allies. it’s even worse when there 
is division between allies” (although he added, “But 
i don’t think there is”).98 growing casualties, too, are 
taking a toll on the alliance members’ willingness to 
supply troops.99 (see table 2.)
NOte: the casualty figures shown here do not include the casualties of Pakistani forces which are believed to be over 1100 Kia to date.  
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obviously, the taliban understand that the insur-
gent “flea” need not defeat his adversary, but merely 
outlast his will to continue to scratch. 
Pressed to address what the future might hold for 
the taliban and afghanistan, this much seems clear: 
the taliban are becoming self-sustaining by produc-
ing effects that feed back into their resource base. 
thus, the movement is capable of surviving and, in 
the absence of a U.s. and nato presence, eventually 
ruling the Pashtun-dominated region of afghanistan 
and spreading its sphere of influence into the fata 
and other regions of Pakistan. there is a clear need to 
address this problem in a more coherent manner. if we 
do not, the taliban has the potential to unleash a new 
wave of terror—more attacks like 9/11, Barcelona, or 
london—across the world. MR
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